In recent decades, the holding of multiparty elections has become a core part of the international community's peace-building agenda (for example, United Nations 2008). This timely volume examines the relationship between elections, especially electoral systems, and conflict management in Africa, while also serving as an important reference for other regions. ECAV compiles data on electoral contention, defined as ‘public acts of mobilization, contestation, or coercion by state or non-state actors used to affect the electoral process, or arising in the context of electoral competition’ (Daxecker, Amicarelli and Jung Reference Daxecker, Amicarelli and Jung2019, 716). This is not surprising, because the matching process does not account for endogenous deployment of more than one military base to an administrative unit. The evidence regarding whether a peacekeeping presence during post-conflict elections prevents the recurrence of civil war is similarly mixed (Brancati and Snyder Reference Brancati and Snyder2013; Flores and Nooruddin Reference Flores and Nooruddin2012; Joshi, Melander and Quinn Reference Joshi, Melander and Quinn2017). Overall, peacekeepers may thus be in a better position to deter electoral violence organized by opposition parties and non-state armed actors compared to electoral violence orchestrated by local and national governments. Several political parties that stand for election have their roots in armed organizations (Matanock Reference Matanock2017; Zukerman Daly Reference Zukerman Daly2019), while scores of former combatants may readily offer their violence services to new parties and politicians (Christensen and Utas Reference Christensen and Utas2008). First, our results speak to the role of peacekeepers in facilitating the war-to-democracy transition, which remains a critical knowledge gap in the current literature on peacekeeping, and one in which the existing results diverge (Walter, Howard and Fortna Reference Walter, Howard and Fortna2020, 10). To address this challenge, our models control for a variety of potentially confounding factors that may influence both peacekeeping deployments and electoral violence. 1 Some might have their origins in former rebel groups, but compete in elections through legitimate political parties (Matanock and Staniland Reference Matanock and Staniland2018). In the 2006 elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN peacekeepers intervened as forces associated with the defeated candidate Vice President Bemba exchanged fire with the Republican Guard headed by President Kabila. Yet imbalances remain, and therefore all matching variables enter in the post-matching regression analyses. On the one hand, we plan to broaden the dataset with instances of domestic terrorism within affluent non-European countries (for instance, domestic terrorism in the U.S. or Japan). 3 Admittedly, not all actors are equally vulnerable to reputation costs. First, our fixed-effects models account for unobserved heterogeneity in the risk of electoral violence across administrative units and electoral periods. While some data sources . Hence, peacekeepers' ability to uphold electoral security warrants explicit consideration. “The Dynamics of Nationalist Terrorism: ETA and the IRA”. Moreover, the legacy of civil war also heightens the availability of agents of violence. Furthermore, while models with cluster-robust standard errors account for temporal dependence between observations in the same administrative unit, observations and errors could be spatially clustered too. An Analysis of Non-territorial Conflicts in the World, 1970-1997”. The committee was organized in late 1995 to respond to a “The Repertoire of Insurgent Violence” Paper delivered at the APSA Annual Meeting (Seattle, September 2011). Even in contexts where electoral incentives for violence might be present, it is ultimately the availability of these agents that determines where and when electoral violence actually occurs (Colombo, D'Aoust and Sterck Reference Colombo, D'Aoust and Sterck2019; Höglund Reference Höglund2009). In Liberia, Mvukiyehe (Reference Mvukiyehe2018) finds that respondents living near UN bases or interacting with the peacekeepers were more likely to participate in national politics, including elections. Most of them draw on the experience of people grappling with the problems of past violence and injustice. There is no "right answer" to the challenge of reconciliation, and so the Handbook prescribes no single approach. It corresponds to about one-tenth of the sample standard deviation in the risk of electoral violence. An Analysis of Non-Territorial Conflicts in the World, 1970-1997. We have generated the first dataset that includes all domestic killings carried out by clandestine terrorist groups within Western Europe from 1965 onwards. First, the consistently positive coefficients on one-sided violence suggest that this war-related violence heightens the risk of violent electoral conflict. Linear regression yields unbiased estimates of the marginal effects, and Monte-Carlo experiments show that these estimates differ little from those of binary choice models (Angrist and Pischke Reference Angrist and Pischke2008, 94ff).Footnote 11, Secondly, we also account for time trends in electoral violence to ensure that a negative correlation between peacekeeping presence and electoral violence is not due to the possibility that peacekeepers deploy in locations that already trend towards peace and stability. War and Conflict in Africa will be essential reading for all students of international peace and security studies as well as Africa's international relations. Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio. Since the actors behind electoral violence are often different from the warring actors, peacekeepers might struggle to maintain electoral security. Geo-PKO covers all UN peacekeeping missions in sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1994–2018. The analyses support the expectation that UN peacekeeping deployments are associated with a lower incident risk of electoral violence in the areas where they are based. London: Brassey's. Leitenberg, Milton . As robustness tests, we therefore examine whether our estimated effects of peacekeeping presence hold for non-lethal electoral conflict that usually receives less attention, using data from the ECAV dataset (Daxecker, Amicarelli and Jung Reference Daxecker, Amicarelli and Jung2019). In addition, lethal electoral violence suffers from less under-reporting than less severe violence (Sundberg and Melander Reference Sundberg and Melander2013, 12).Footnote 7 To examine Hypothesis 2, we split the sample into the pre- and post-election periods and test the effect of UN military personnel in the two samples. The following list provides access to the datasets used by authors of articles appearing in Journal of Peace Research since 1998. The committee has identified a number of specific techniques and . Perpetrators' reputation costs from exposure are partly tied to international audiences. Those armed groups that cannot liberate territory from the state’s hands trigger a conflict dynamics which is quite different from that of groups with capacity to seize and hold territory. These findings are significant for research and policy. Analyzing an original dataset of 406 organizations, I find evidence that partial outcome-goal achievement and state supporters help militant organizations overcome the obstacles preventing transition. Forthcoming. While peacekeepers lack the capacity to use offensive force (for example, Howard Reference Howard2019), they can impose physical barriers between perpetrators and possible targets of electoral violence. The only control variable that is consistently significant across the models is the trend in state-based violence. Among his recent books, Más democracia y menos liberalismo (Katz 2010), Años de cambios, años de crisis. When we aggregate events to our units of analysis (administrative units and months), then 63 out of 16,671 observations exhibit one or more events of electoral violence. Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund present the new data in JCR: Introducing the Deadly Electoral Conflict Dataset (DECO) - Hanne Fjelde, Kristine Höglund, 2021 ( sagepub.com ) https://journals.sagepub . This study evaluates peacekeepers' effectiveness in relation to one critical, but understudied security outcome in transitions from war to more peaceful politics: electoral violence. Published online by Cambridge University Press:  He has been Rice Associate Professor at Yale University, Associate Professor in the Political Science Department of the Universidad Pompeu Fabra, Visiting Scholar at New York University, and Assistant Professor in the Sociology Department of the University of Salamanca. Most contemporary United Nations peacekeeping missions have mandates to oversee, organize and secure elections (Smidt Reference Smidt2020a). Thus the security-enhancing effects of local peacekeeping deployments in the electoral period are substantively important for peacebuilding success. International Relations Studies Series, 12 (International Studies Library, 23) Based on three departure points - a novel analytical framework, previously unpublished data on conflict and conflict resolution in Africa, and a survey of ... Our results are substantively the same (see Appendix B). The algorithm prunes observations with and without a peacekeeping base that are too drastically different from each other in terms of the values of the matching variables. Finally, our study speaks to the literature on peacekeepers' impact on security-related outcomes and, specifically, their role in securing the post-war period. Of course, UN peacekeepers' military presence deals with the symptoms, rather than the root causes of, violent electoral contention. Terrorism and Political Violence. Elections are critical events in war-to-peace transitions: they mark the transition from violent to peaceful modes of political contestation and spearhead efforts for more inclusive and legitimate governance (for example, Manning Reference Manning2004; Reilly Reference Reilly, Jarstad and Sisk2008). The Electoral Integrity Project focuses on why elections fails and what can be done about this. Daily charts, graphs, news and updates Reference Cil2020). Subnational deployment of United Nations peacekeepers, Winning the peace locally: UN peacekeeping and local conflict, Keeping electoral peace? The models control for all matching covariates as well as the size of the administrative area and the one-month temporal lag of UN military presence. Figure 2. Again in line with Howard (Reference Howard2019), we therefore suggest that peacekeeping is also associated with economic and institutional incentives that induce domestic actors to desist from acts of electoral violence. The best country-by-country assessment of human rights. The human rights records of more than ninety countries and territories are put into perspective in Human Rights Watch's signature yearly report. In addition to creating the DTV dataset, we want to complement this work in two directions. This should make it harder to find a security-enhancing effect of local peacekeeping presence. The analysis of data reveals that . In Appendix C we show similar results for a less sparse measure of electoral violence and contention (Daxecker, Amicarelli and Jung Reference Daxecker, Amicarelli and Jung2019). The State of Conflict and Violence in Asia 2021. And how does electoral violence influence conflict resolution and democracy? The average Disease Richness (Deadly) is around 2.9 pathogens. First, through monitoring and reporting, peacekeepers increase public accountability for actors that use electoral violence and thus amplify domestic and international reputation costs. Specific case x�Xˎ�6��+�u�֌-�o� ����i��`���II;VI!X�4b��X���w�E|��_I�_���^︥����?�^�������'1h�R Exploring regional peacekeepers' effects on securing post-war elections and subsequent political trajectories presents an interesting avenue for future research. 2012. Drawing on fifteen years of study and firsthand field research—interviewing generals, former guerrillas, activists, politicians, mobsters, and law enforcement in countries around the world—Kleinfeld tells the stories of societies that ... Found insideThe aim of this chapter is to provide a global overview of general trends in electoral violence over the post–Cold War period, based on a newly released dataset, the Dataset of Countries at Risk of Electoral Violence (CREV), ... Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies-National Research Council 1999-05-20 This paper is one of a series being prepared for the National Research Council's Committee on International Conflict Resolution. Aguilar, Paloma and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca. He holds a PhD in political science from the European University Institute, Florence. Government leaders may use this leverage to reduce the constraints that peacekeepers impose on their strategies for maintaining power, including their use of electoral coercion (Piccolino and Karlsrud Reference Piccolino and Karlsrud2011). The politics of elections might thus interfere with peacekeepers' influence on electoral violence, so the UN military presence may have a greater violence-reducing effect in the pre-election period than in the post-election period. "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, Consistent with Howard (Reference Howard2019), we propose that such non-material reputation costs can persuade actors to refrain from sponsoring violence. Replication Datasets. In addition, peacekeepers' ability to curb violence that is associated with elections is likely influenced by the politics of peacekeeping. Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio. Medium inter-organizational conflict .58 Electoral politics is a minor strategy & no non-military support The Protection of Civilians (POC) is a responsibility which includes all parts of a peacekeeping mission, civilian, military and police functions. Mean covariate differences before and after matching. "Introducing the Deadly Electoral Conflict Dataset (DECO)." Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2009. The reduction is substantively important. Anti-government and pro-government electoral violence. While observers benefit electoral integrity overall, they also temporally and spatially displace some electoral violence (Daxecker Reference Daxecker2014; Ichino and Schündeln Reference Ichino and Schündeln2012) and increase contention after election day (Von Borzyskowski Reference Von Borzyskowski2019b). A second driver of electoral violence is the presence of agents who are able and willing to carry out intimidation and coercion. He has published articles in a number of journals, such as Journal of Conflict Resolution, Politics & Society, Annual Review of Political Science, European Union Politics, Journal of Peace Research, Party Politics, Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Revista Internacional de Sociología and others. Found inside – Page 49Intersection of three sets Electoral harassment by the government n Electoral riot or protest n Deadly electoral ... ( groups ) of electoral violence as reported by the NELDA database in the region ( see Figure 3.2 and Table 3.3 ) . De la Calle, Luis and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca. "Death in Wars and Conflicts Between 1945 and 2000," Peace Studies Program Occasional Paper #29. The first release of the DTV dataset covers all killings carried out by terrorist groups in Western Europe from 1965 to 2005. To test Hypothesis 3, we construct two additional dependent variables that count violence by anti-government actors (for example, opposition militias and rebel groups) and violence by pro-government actors (for example, soldiers, police forces, and government militias), respectively. Our analyses also suggest that peacekeepers may be able to avoid some of the unintended consequences that plague the record of international election monitoring missions, as peacekeepers do not seem to incite violent contention related to elections, or geographically shift electoral violence to administrative units nearby where fewer peacekeepers are deployed (Daxecker Reference Daxecker2012; Daxecker Reference Daxecker2014; Ichino and Schündeln Reference Ichino and Schündeln2012). Thus, beyond their immediate security-enhancing role, peacekeepers' success in reducing electoral violence might have longer-term benefits for post-war democratic transitions. Found inside – Page 181The empirical findings on routine violence in Chapter 5 are limited to data up to 2003, concentrating the analysis on the ... Electoral violence has increasingly complicated the democratic experiments in most of developing countries. Preventing Deadly Conflict, which issued its final report in December 1997. A central part of this definition is that the violence is directly tied to features of the electoral process such as political parties, voters, candidates, polling or the institutional arrangements surrounding elections (Fjelde and Höglund Reference Fjelde and Höglund2021). Peacekeepers can also reduce the risk of electoral violence by influencing the implementation costs for violent tactics. Reference Condra2017; Weidmann and Callen Reference Weidmann and Callen2012). Hence, peacekeeping presence also seems to benefit electoral security in neighbouring administrative units. We have used several first-hand sources (for instance, local newspapers, monographs, and official list of victims) to compile a comprehensive dataset on domestic terrorism in Western Europe that includes many more killings than those of existing datasets: we have collected information on killings carried out by left-wing, right-wing, neo-nazi, pro-secessionist and vigilante-type of terrorist groups. The accompanying codebook provides detailed information on each of the variables contained within the dataset, with coding conventions, examples and the sources used to generate the data. Yet regional peacekeeping operations are usually more militarily focused. Based on literature review and inputs from surveyed agencies, this book assesses the value and role of early warning for the prevention of violent conflict and identifies the most effective systems. The Nigeria Social Violence project has constructed a database from domestic and international reports of "non-criminal" violence in the country. In the vicinity of peacekeeping bases, principals responsible for electoral violence may thus face a higher risk of public exposure, a more mobilized electorate and a greater popular backlash against the use of coercive electoral tactics.Footnote 3. Building on UCDP events, The Deadly Electoral Violence Dataset (DECO) provides global data on election-related violent events from 1989 to 2017. Did George Bush's use of the Willie Horton story during the1988 presidential campaign communicate most effectively when no one noticed its racial meaning? These are the replication files, codebooks and datasets corresponding to the following article: De la Calle, Luis and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca. The analysis finds a negative association between peacekeeping presence and the risk of electoral violence. For the dependent variable, we use information from the Deadly Electoral Conflict (DECO) dataset (Fjelde and Höglund Reference Fjelde and Höglund 2021). V-Dem launched the updated Dataset v7 "Largest Database on Democracy in History" and the first V-Dem Annual Report! For example, peacekeepers can deploy around political gatherings, polling stations and vote-counting facilities. Our study also contributes to the debate about how international actors can spearhead electoral integrity in fragile political contexts. An Analysis of Non-Territorial Conflicts in the World, 1970-1997 Replication Data: Revolutionary Terrorism in the Developed World, 1970-2000. Therefore, logit models would only use less than 3 per cent of the observations in the sample. The worldwide distribution of MHV diseases is illustrated in Figure 1 (b). 2012. 25, Violence, Elections, and Party Politics, pp. Addressing these questions with a combination of rigorous qualitative and quantitative approaches, Stephanie Burchard explores both the causes and consequences of electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa. Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided . Yet, given the absence of a suitable instrument and our knowledge of the determinants of local peacekeeping deployment, it appears to be an appropriate technique (Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis Reference Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis2016). The only cross-national study on this relationship shows that peacekeepers’ impact on the risk of electoral violence is conditional on their activity in assisting with electoral security and organizing elections (Smidt Reference Smidt2020a). Instituto Juan March: Madrid. The datasets are listed below within specific categories: cabinets, citizens, constitutions, political institutions, parties and politicians, democracy, economics, elections, international relations, media, policy, political elites, political speeches and debates. In the 21st century, conflicts have increased sharply since 2010 Global trends in armed conflict, 1946-2014 2 0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000 Politics & Society 39 (3): 451-472. We have collected detailed evidence on almost 5,000 victims of domestic terrorism all over Western Europe. Specifically, UN military forces often help enforce arms embargoes, collect and secure small arms and light weapons, and organize local disarmament and demobilization sites that separate ex-combatants from the civilian population. Found inside – Page 163The link between electoral malpractices, types of regime, and violence needs to be tested at macro-level in ... and the backlash against these by the security forces and regime supporters, are classic triggers of fatal conflict. A growing body of literature has testified to the ability of UN peacekeepers to end civil war violence, prevent its resurgence and protect civilians from wartime abuse (for reviews, see Di Salvatore and Ruggeri Reference Di Salvatore, Ruggeri and Thompson2017; Walter, Howard, and Fortna Reference Walter, Howard and Fortna2020). Since electoral violence, by definition, only occurs during the electoral period, a longer trend variable comes at the expense of losing many observations. Only in specifications that do not control for electoral violence trends is the coefficient not significant at conventional levels. Post-matching logistic regression of electoral violence, We note that the coefficient on concurrent UN peacekeeping bases would lose significance if we excluded the temporal lag of UN peacekeeping presence from our models. Thus peacekeepers' capacity to detect and report electoral violence and to amplify the associated reputation costs provides them with a source of leverage that is particularly useful for maintaining electoral security. statistical analysis draws on a dataset prepared by Judith Kelley (2012), who codes international 2 Monitoring is a core function of UN peacekeeping operations, and a central mechanism for the violence-reducing effect of UN peacekeepers (Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson Reference Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson2019; Fortna Reference Fortna, Jarstad and Sisk2008; Walter Reference Walter2002). 2006. What are the causes of electoral violence? This handbook integrates theory and practice and emphasizes the importance of analyzing the causes of peace as well as the causes of conflict. Secondly, we control for characteristics of the peacekeepers' operating environment. Combining the non-state data with UCDP's data on state-based conflict (Gleditsch et al. The presentation, titled " Electoral Volatility in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes " was a part of the session "Elections Under Autocracy" on Sunday, September 13, 2020. Infrastructural challenges could also influence electoral violence, for example by making it difficult for election workers to reach the area. For the first trend variable, we subtract the average level of electoral violence 2 and 3 months previously from the level of electoral violence one month previously. We approach these issues conceptually, analytically, and empirically, as can be seen in the collection of papers already published during the last years. Across all model specifications, the effect coefficient on UN military bases is consistently negative. Figure 3. 2009. Two types of war-related elections are distinguished: elections held during…. De la Calle, Luis and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca. “Revolutionary Dreams and Terrorist Violence in the Developed World: Explaining Country Variation.” Journal of Peace Research 46 (5): 687-706. Principals who participate in elections and aspire to be politically legitimate actors will use electoral violence selectively. His work focuses on the dynamics of armed groups, with a special focus on terrorism. That is, exposure to electoral violence may reduce electoral support from moderate voters and endangers potential international benefits, such as foreign aid. After election day, electoral violence includes contentious behavior, such as violent protest and riots, to shape political developments after contested results. Thus, it may pose a particularly thorny challenge for peacekeepers. "figures": true, Through their contribution to high-integrity elections, allowing voters and candidates to exercise their political rights without coercion and intimidation, peacekeeping presence may also influence the longer-term prospects for democratic governance. Megan Reif's research seeks to explain variation in election violence, reform, and democratization across history and polities, emphasizing Algeria, Pakistan, the Middle East, and Muslim world. While electoral violence poses new challenges for peacekeeping, we point to two important drivers of electoral violence that could also make this type of violence particularly amenable to peacekeepers' intervention. For instance, before the 2010 elections in Côte d'Ivoire, then-President Laurent Gbagbo successfully marginalized the role of the UN peacekeeping operation in securing the electoral process by creating ‘a new internal body in charge of election security’ (Piccolino and Karlsrud Reference Piccolino and Karlsrud2011, 455, emphasis added). We also propose that the ‘politics of peacekeeping’ – and, specifically, the need for consent from host governments – might render peacekeepers more adept at reducing violence by non-state actors. Variables such as the date of the attack, the location, the name of the victim, her status, the group responsible, the method used and other relevant descriptive variables are included. An Analysis of Non-territorial Conflicts in the World, 1970-1997”. This book provides the first comprehensive account of this phenomenon, exploring how women came to give these experiences a name - violence against women in politics - and lobbied for its increased recognition by citizens, states, and ... Peacekeepers are more constrained in acting against the host government because their deployment and activity requires its consent and cooperation. The reputation cost-related mechanism rests on peacekeepers' ability to expose violence. 2003. In The Last Days of New Paris, China Miéville entwines true historical events and people with his daring, uniquely imaginative brand of fiction, reconfiguring history and art into something new. “Beauty will be convulsive. . . .” 1941. Exposure to electoral violence can harden ethnic identities, polarize the electorate and make violent means more accepted among voters (Gutiérrez-Romero Reference Gutiérrez-Romero2014). This article develops a conceptual framework based on three clusters of factors to analyse the conflict-generating aspects of elections in war-torn societies: the key actors in the electoral processes; the institutions of elections; and the stakes of the elections. Yet curbing electoral violence likely entails distinct challenges for peacekeepers, as the targets, perpetrators and nature of such violence could look very different from the wartime dynamics. %PDF-1.3 De la Calle, Luis and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca. The local presence of peacekeepers may thus deter groups from engaging in electoral violence.Footnote 4. To do so, we subtract the violent events count two years previously from the count one year previously (the first to the twelfth month prior to the specific observation). Yet the deterrent and mitigating impact on violent electoral contention may prevent violent escalatory spirals that increase the risk of renewed large-scale violence. The variable civil war is dichotomous indicator of whether there is (1) or is not (0) a civil conflict on the country's territory in that month. Has data issue: true Details on this policy can be found on our Submissions and Enquiries page. 2011. Although we expect a negative relationship overall, we also propose that the ‘politics of elections’ intervene to make peacekeepers particularly effective at reducing violence in the pre-election phase, as reputation costs might be more salient before the ballots have been counted. Second, peacekeepers increase the implementation costs of executing electoral violence. summary statistics in Appendix A). However, most militant organizations remain incapable of transitioning due to two common constraints: the base constituency's . The driving motivation of this project is that territorial control is paramount to explain variation in violent behavior. The World in Conflict: War Annual 6. In addition to technical electoral assistance, peacekeeping missions, for example, deploy uniformed personnel to safeguard polling stations, conduct military patrols to ensure that voters can exercise their political rights, and protect electoral materials.
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